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Abstract
The former research work on material and financial supply 
chain management has mainly adopted marginal analysis 
and EOQ model, which are based on the traditional 
idea of self interest maximization or “Efficiencism”. 
However, this idea often drives those strong enterprises 
in a supply chain to occupy their weaker partners’ funds 
by corporation finance policy; thus results in the break of 
the monetary flows along the chain. This paper discusses 
the interest unbalance within such a small system and its 
negative effects; then proposes a way to resolve it from 
view of alliance and cooperation. A simple model of stable 
money flow along supply chain is given.
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IntroductIon
In the time of supply chain, the competition lies among 
supply chains other than individual enterprises. Supply 
chain is an alliance of a series of businesses upstream 
and downstream, which are supply-demand relation 
interlinked. There isn’t a super-manager over all partners 
to compulsorily administrate them like within a singe 
enterprise. They ally on a voluntary basis, so the core 
problem of supply chain management is the coordination 
among the businesses along the chain. 
A supply chain is an integration of harmonious flows 
of information, material and money. The performance 
of a supply chain is determined by the degree of the 
three flows’ coordination. Any inconsistency and 
disharmony among them will weaken the whole chain. 
Many enterprises will make concerted efforts with 
orther partners on material flow, such as making orders 
and warehousing; while they prefer to make their fund 
management independly.We often see such phenomenon 
in reality: the stronger enterprise in a supply chain always 
makes its advantage in the business bargaining and ask for 
trade credit which allows it to make delay in payments for 
its suppliers, while for prepayments from its distributors 
or retailers downstream. As it often occupies the weaker 
partners’ circulating fund, the latter’s formerly insufficient 
fund will get worse, which frequently results in the break 
of the monetary flows through the supply chain,even the 
break of the supply chain itself. The main cause of this 
phenomenon is the stronger enterprises’ inner motive 
of self interest maximization and disregarding others’ 
benefit, even those of their partners. This motive is always 
affirmed and supported by all kinds of modern economic 
theories: the famous assumption of “Economic Man” is 
the foundation of them. 
Although works on upstream money flow management 
among SCM are getting increased nowadays, most models 
they present are based on the assumption of “Economic 
Man”, and this will encourage the formerly described 
dangerous tendency other than prevent it. In fact, this way 
of thinking is getting more and more practically unsuitable 
in such an interdependent and reciprocal symbiosis global 
economy time. We need to reconsider the problem from 
economic theories.
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1.  relAted economIc theorIes
The tradeoff between efficiency and fairness has long 
been paid attention to by economists. However, modern 
economics seems to emphasize more efficiency than 
fairness. Classical economists think that selfishness in 
the market is most efficient which can lead to Pareto 
best. So the whole social and economical system greatly 
encourages economic man behavior, which has enlarged 
the unfairness throughout the world. Obviously, the 
unfairness is not efficient. Recently, American financial 
crisis is the explosion of extreme economic man behavior, 
which has made great  retrogression both on economic 
efficiency and social well-being. Economic man behavior 
and “efficiencism” will lead to income polarization 
and this is one of the greatest barriers of sustainable 
development in the economic system. 
In fact, we should consider not only the sustainable 
development of economy within the narrow-sensed 
economic framework, but also that of human activities 
in the natural historical category, because human being’s 
social and economic life closely relies on the natural 
ecological world. The historical and natural framework 
limits man’s economical activities. That means a certain 
way of economic development decides the way of living 
and the ultimate degree of natural resource utilization 
and ecological damage in a certain long historical run, 
which form the natural and ecological border. This border 
in turn confines the economic activities themselves. 
During the primary stage of economic development, 
“efficiencism” has greatly helped to promote the whole 
society’s economy, because the activities haven’t 
reached by far or even being near to the natural border. 
Individual’s economic efficiency brings not only oneself 
but also the whole society’s wealth. That’s its positive 
effect. As approaching to the boarder, the negative 
effect reveals. And the negative effect is the more and 
more serious income unfairness(resulting from initial 
endowment inequality adding “efficiencism” ) and all 
kinds of negative economic externality (resulting from 
economic man behavior and “efficiencism”), which can 
lower the whole society’s efficiency. There’s a trend that 
the negative effect will surpass the positive one. The 
key problem of negative effect is the unequillibrium of 
the society it makes. When the unequillibrium reaches a 
critical point, the system probably breaks down. Financial 
crisis is one of such situations. So the most important 
thing is to keep balance in the development in a system.
There are two traditional ways of resource allocation: 
market allocation and administrative distribution. Only 
using market allocation is easy to cause unequillibrium in 
the practical economy. It is the hotbed of economic man 
behavior and “efficiencism”. Administrative distribution 
can be only used in a rather small system considering the 
high management cost. In fact, there’s a third way other 
than the two. That is all kinds of alliance. It can remedy 
the unequillibrium problem of pure market economy. In a 
sense, alliance is the combination form of the two. But it 
has its own nature and functions. One of its most prominent 
functions is that it can help to construct the equilibrium 
in a economic and social system. It can keep the balance 
between competition and cooperation. So if we hope a 
system develop evenly, steadily and thus fast, some alliance 
methods are needed. Supply chain is one of such alliance 
methods. It has brought us great productivity and reduced 
negative externality all around the world. But it still hasn’t 
fully functioned, because no enough cooperation. 
Along this line of thinking, we argue that supply chain 
needs more deep cooperation to develop balancedly, 
stably, and integrately, not individual efficiently. It 
is by this means that can the development of supply 
chain and all its members be sustainable. In this paper, 
we focus on monetary flow of supply chain. We think 
the continuity and stability of its money flow is the 
foundation of the supply chain’s good performance, and 
thus has the development and prosperity of each member. 
So the continuous money flow is the prerequisite of self 
economic interest maximization in the supply chain.
2.  A model
In order to obtain the continuity and stability of a supply 
chain’s monetary flow, we establish a model of three-level 
supply chain, as shown in Figure 1.
Manufacturer M
Supplier A
Supplier B
Retailor C
Direction of money move 
Figure 1
Three-Level Supply Chain Fund Flow Model
We suppose that the manufacturer M has only 
two suppliers, A and B; and it has only one retailer or 
distributor C. This is a very simple reproduction process, 
i.e.no more capital is invested to expand the business. The 
outflows of M only include the purchase of raw material 
from A and B, no other logistical cost and administrative 
expenses. The only inflows are the payment from C. M has 
no external financing. All cash outflows rely on inflows 
and the business’ own capital. When the cash inflows are 
less than the cash outflows, the flow of money breaks out. 
The situation of M can represent any point of the supply 
chain. Now we consider the manufacturer’s money flow. 
All transference of fund is immediate. The moment of 
transaction with retailer C is the reference time.
Its cash inflow is as:
Research on Financial Supply Chain 
From View of Stability
34Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
( )[( )(1 %) ( ) / (1 ) 1 ]c c ca b p T T T F T dT
+∞
−∞
+ + δ + +α + +α∫
( )[( )(1 %) ( ) / (1 ) 1 ]c c ca b p T T T F T dT
+∞
−∞
+ + δ + +α + +α∫
 (1)
Its cash outflow is as:
[ ( ' ' )(1 ) ( ' ' )(1 )]a a a b b ba T T T T T b T T T T T dT
+∞
−∞
δ − − + +α + δ − − + +α∫
[ ( ' ' )(1 ) ( ' ' )(1 )]a a a b b ba T T T T T b T T T T T dT
+∞
−∞
δ − − + +α + δ − − + +α∫  
(2)
If we hope the flow of money does not break during 
the observation time period, we must make this happen:
( )[( )(1 %) ( ) / (1 ) 1c c ca b p T T T F T
+∞
−∞
+ + δ + +α + +α∫  
( ' ' )(1 ) ( ' ' )(1 )] 0a a a b b ba T T T T T b T T T T T dT− δ − − + +α − δ − − + +α ≥    ( )[( )(1 %) ( ) / (1 ) 1c c ca b p T T T F T
+∞
−∞
+ + δ + +α + +α∫  
( ' ' )(1 ) ( ' ' )(1 )] 0a a a b b ba T T T T T b T T T T T dT− δ − − + +α − δ − − + +α ≥    
' ' ' '  (3)
a material A’s cost
b material B’s cost
p% profit rate
α capital’s time value rate per day
F factory’s own capital
T’ the factory’s lead time
Ta’ supplier A’s lead time
Tb’ supplier B’s lead time
T the time transaction happens
Ta time delay of payment for supplier A
Tb time delay of payment for supplier B
Tc time delay of retailor C’s payment for the factory 
This is an impulse function which can well describe 
the supply chain’s upstream flow of money. a, b, p, F, 
T’, Ta’, Tb’ are independent variables, and Ta, Tb, Tc are 
decision variables or dependent variables. What we want 
to do is to find the interrelation among Ta, Tb and Tc, and 
discuss their feasible ranges.
3.  more explAnAtIon of the model
According to the reality, we discuss three situations of 
payment time respectively, shown in Table 1: 
Table 1 
Situations of payment time
Situation1 Situation2 Situation3
Ta or Tb fixed fixed stochastic
Tc fixed stochastic stochastic
Situation1. 
The payment times of the factory for the supplier A 
and B, and that of the retailer C for the factory are fixed. 
This is a push mode of supply chain. So, the simplified 
result is:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )21 1 1 1 1 % 0c a b cF T a T b T T a b p+α − +α + +α +α + + + ≥  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )21 1 1 1 1 % 0c a b cF T a T b T T a b p+α − +α + +α +α + + + ≥  
(α≥0, p≥0) (4)
In which, Ta and Tb are decided by the turnover rate 
of circulating fund (TR), order quantity (OR), bargaining 
power (BP) and industry practice (IP).
( )1fa a a a a aT TR ,OR ,BP ,IP=  (5)
( )1fb b b b b bT TR ,OR ,BP ,IP=  (6)
If Ta, Tb, and all the lead times are decided, and it is 
supposed that the business A and business B have their 
own capital to pay the material for the first order from 
M. We can use another simpler way to calculate their 
relations. The condition of the money flow’s continuity is:
' 'c a aT T T T≤ − −  (7)
' 'c b bT T T T≤ − −  (8)
Situation2.
The payment time of the manufacturer for the supplier 
A and B are fixed, and the payment of the retailer C for 
the manufacturer Tc is a random variable which is changed 
according to retail market fluctuation. This is a push- 
pull mode of supply chain. If the values of Tc are normal 
distributed, then
( )c c cT 2∼ Ν µ ,σ  (9)
The condition of the money flow’s continuity is 
decided by (3) and (9). We can choose the range of σ 
between (_3, +3) whose probability is 99.74%. 
If we don’t know the accurate probability distribution, 
we can use Chebyshev Theorem,
( ) 21 1 , 0P X k k k| −µ |< σ ≥ − ⁄ >
In order to get higher probability, here we choose
k=4, the range will be (μ_4σ, μ+4σ) whose probability 
is 93.75%.
Situation3. 
The payment time of the factory for the supplier A 
and B, and that of the retailer C for the factory M are all 
uncertain. Ta, Tb and Tc are random variables. 
A. If this is a strict pull mode of supply chain, Tc is 
changed with the market demand, then Ta, and Tb are 
changed with Tc, then the expectationsμa, μb, are the same 
of cµ , the variancesσa and σb are the same of c2σ .μc, σc 
are determined by retail market demand and bargaining 
power. If we still use Chebyshev Theorem and the 
probability of range (μ_4σ, μ+4σ), the relationship among 
Ta, Tb and Tc  must meet:
4 ' 'c c a aT T Tµ σ ≤ − −－  (10)
4 ' 'c c b bT T Tµ σ ≤ − −－  (11)
B. If μa, μb, are different fromμc, and σa and σb 
are different fromσc , which are determined by market 
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demand and other influencing factors such as the turnover 
rate of circulating fund (TR), order quantity (OR), 
bargaining power, and industry practice (IP), the situation 
will be a little more complicated. The condition of the 
money flow’s continuity is decided by (3) and the random 
variables Ta, Tb and Tc.
4.  expAnded model
The expanded model relaxes the restriction of simple 
reproduction.  We now suppose i t  is  a  extended 
reproduction. The condition of the money flow’s 
continuity will change into this:
( )
lim 1
2
{(1 %) [( )(1 %) ( ) / (1 ) 1
T i
c c cp a b p T T T F T
+∞ −
−∞
+ + + δ + +α + +α∫ ∫
( ' ' )(1 ) ( ' ' )(1 )]} 0a a a b b ba T T T T T b T T T T T dTdi− δ − − + +α − δ − − + +α ≥( )
lim 1
2
{(1 %) [( )(1 %) ( ) / (1 ) 1
T i
c c cp a b p T T T F T
+∞ −
−∞
+ + + δ + +α + +α∫ ∫
( ' ' )(1 ) ( ' ' )(1 )]} 0a a a b b ba T T T T T b T T T T T dTdi− δ − − + +α − δ − − + +α ≥
( )
lim 1
2
{(1 %) [( )(1 %) ( ) / (1 ) 1
T i
c c cp a b p T T T F T
+∞ −
−∞
+ + + δ + +α + +α∫ ∫
( ' ' )(1 ) ( ' ' )(1 )]} 0a a a b b ba T T T T T b T T T T T dTdi− δ − − + +α − δ − − + +α ≥( )
lim 1
2
{(1 %) [( )(1 %) ( ) / (1 ) 1
T i
c c cp a b p T T T F T
+∞ −
−∞
+ + + δ +α + +α∫ ∫
( ' ' )(1 ) ( ' ' )(1 )]} 0a a a b b ba T T T T T b T T T T T dTdi− δ − − + +α − δ − − + +α ≥ , (2≤i≤Tlim) (12)
Tlim all periods during the observation
i the number of the reproduction period
 It can be simplified as:
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }lim 12 1+ % 1 % / 1 1 1 1 0?
T i
c c a bp a b p T F T a T b T di− + + +α + +α − +α − +α ≥ ∫
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }lim 12 1+ % 1 % / 1 1 1 1 0?
T i
c c a bp a b p T F T a T b T di− + + +α + +α − +α − +α ≥ ∫
 (13)
That means at the end of each period of production 
circle, the profit will be added to the material procurement 
investment, and the adding ratio is fix to (1+p%), except 
the initial fund F.
5.  AnAlysIs tools
In order to assure a continuous money flow in a supply 
chain, we analyze the relations among Ta, Tb and Tc from 
two type of production mode. In the first mode, i.e. the 
simple reproduction mode, we discuss three situations. 
The practical case studies will be given in another paper.
summArIes
The monetary flow’s continuity of supply chain has been 
explained from view of economic theory relating to fairness 
and efficiency. In this paper, impulse function is borrowed 
from signal system to build our basic model. Then we 
discuss three situations according to practical market. The 
whole process provides a theoretical method of developing 
continuous fund flow just by trade credit. Only when this 
internal financing is used to the most and is still not enough, 
external financing is added. More detailed analysis and 
conclusions will be provided in another paper.
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